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Introduction
It seems to be conventional wisdom that natural resources in general, and oil in particular, are a 'curse' rather than a 'blessing'. The growing literature on the 'resource curse' and the 'paradox of plenty' (Karl 1997) has established important causal claims linking resource abundance and dependence to corruption, authoritarianism, economic decline and violent conflict. Oil-dependent countries in particular, it has been frequently argued, "are among the most economically troubled, the most authoritarian, and the most conflict-ridden states in the world today" (Karl & Gary 2003: 18) . As regards violent conflict, resource curse theory claims that resource abundance provides both finance and motive for armed conflict ('greed and grievance'); adverse effects on the economy and institutions create further, indirect causes of violence (Ross 2003) . Empirically, both quantitative and country case studies have established evidence that resource dependent and abundant countries are indeed more 6 likely to lapse into domestic violence (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler 2001 , de Soysa 2002 , and the debate is already moving towards practical recommendations in terms of 'actions and options' for conflict prevention and resolution (Bannon & Collier 2003 , Gary & Karl 2003 . However, the relationship between abundance in natural resources and violence might be trickier than assumed by the public eye and in the scientific mainstream. The paradigm has come 'under distress' (Ron 2005) . According to Michael L. Ross (2004) the positive knowledge on the relationship between natural resources and violence is confined to an adverse effect of oil and 'lootable' resources 1 . In any case, violence in resource abundant or dependent countries is a mere probability. For one country affected, two are spared from violence (Ross 2003) . We do not believe these countries are just lucky. In fact, this suggests that whether or not the resource curse strikes, and the manner in which it does so, will depend on a complex set of context conditions in a given country (Collier et al. 2003 , Ross 2003 , Humphreys 2005 ).
Context conditions differ in terms of a) pre-and non-resource, country specific conditions, and b) resource specific conditions (Basedau 2005) . The latter include the type of resource, the degree of abundance and dependence, and the revenue management system. Once resource production has started or becomes a realistic option in the minds of actors, these conditions interact with non-resource, country-specific conditions such as the level of socioeconomic development, inter-communal relations, the functioning of institutions, and the strategies of political leaders (as well as the degree and duration of violent conflict). Only recently have all these surrounding conditions become part of the research agenda (Collier & Hoeffler 2005: 627) .
It is the purpose of this paper to engage in a preliminary inquiry of these context conditions and transmission channels as regards their effect on the prevalence of domestic violence. We decided to concentrate on oil because it has been of particular notoriety in the literature (Ross 2004 , Fearon 2005 , even though this notoriety has been questioned in recent studies (Smith 2004) . The central research problem thus is: Why are some oil-producing countries prone to violence and instability while others are not? Are certain resource-specific and nonresource conditions in oil and gas-producing countries systematically and plausibly linked to violence or stability?
In particular, this paper seeks to show that two distinct mechanisms of oil revenue distribution -large-scale distribution as opposed to distribution through patronage networks -are 1 Ross ' (2004: 337) four major findings are: Oil increases the likelihood of civil war, particularly secessionist conflict. 'Lootable' commodities (gemstones, drugs) do not make a conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen existing conflict (see also Lujala et al. 2005) ; there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities and civil war; the association between primary commodities and the onset of civil war is statistically not robust. 7 significantly connected with the occurrence and absence of violent conflict respectively.
While revenue distribution has hitherto been assumed to be largely determined by resourcespecific factors, the evidence presented in this article suggests that country-specific context conditions play an important role in the way revenues are distributed. Thus, the monolithic category traditionally associated with authoritarianism and political instability -the Petrostate -is differentiated into two largely exclusive systems of oil rent distribution, which in turn can help explain the remarkable political stability, and hence conflict-riddenness, of oildependent states.
After having outlined the methodology, the first analytic section of this paper deals with the relative degree of oil income. Subsequently, two ideal types of oil-producing states are established on the basis of theoretical discussion and quantitative evidence linking transmission channels of oil revenue to conflict, and hence stability. Two apparent exceptions to these types, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, are discussed in more depth. Finally, both theoretical and methodological conclusions are drawn.
Methodology
There has been a vocal debate on the possible consequences of different resource types as regards the likelihood of resource-related violence, and we acknowledge its relevance (Le Billon 2001 , Ross 2003 . However, an exhaustive test of all context conditions is clearly beyond the scope of this paper and we therefore concentrate on one particular resource type -oil and gas -in order to avoid the serious methodological implications of including different resource types in the analysis.
The sample comprises 37 oil-producing countries in the developing world. We excluded industrial countries such as Norway, given their sharply divergent socio-economic and political situation. We set thresholds for oil and gas-producing countries in terms of their dependence on these resources. In order to exclude insignificant producers in terms of domestic relevance, we set a ratio of at least 10% of the export earnings.
We employed several measures for the dependent variable (see Appendices 1 and 2). We opted for a broader understanding of political stability that does not focus exclusively on large-scale conflicts but tries to capture problems below this threshold as well. Armed conflict and political stability will be measured by World Bank conflict data and the World Bank Governance Indicator "political stability and absence of violence".
For the independent variables we tried to capture relevant phenomena rather than using readily available data. These variables include alternative measures for dependence on and variables. The latter owes mainly to the fact that some of the newly introduced pertinent data was not readily available for longer periods of time and had to be collected for this study.
We use a combination of methodologies in order to capture the multi-faceted nature of the relationship between natural resources and political stability/violence. Quantitative measures will be applied as well as macro-qualitative and 'medium N' comparisons. A more indepth and qualitative study of two country cases will attempt to determine why these are deviating from general findings.
A Paradox of Plenty? Oil Income Per Capita and Political Stability
Almost all quantitatively-oriented scholars who study the link between natural resources and conflict control for population size. However, the question as to why so many small resource-rich countries are spared from violence has received little attention. The answer may be found in a more narrow methodological question: Abundance in natural resources is commonly measured by the degree of dependence in terms of percentages of exports and GDP (see Ross 2004: table 1) . Obviously, this measure does not take into account the relative wealth of countries. A country can rely heavily on oil for exports without enjoying oil wealth. Oil constituted over 95% of Nigeria's exports in 2002, but if we keep in mind that Nigeria's population by far exceeds 100 million inhabitants, then -statistically -one Nigerian would have earned a miserable 30 cents a day from the US$ 13.7 bn Nigerian oil export sales in 2002. In contrast, the earnings per capita in Equatorial Guinea would have been 50 times higher (US$ 14.87). In this case it can hardly be argued that dependence is a 'proxy' for abundance. Oil abundance in Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea is a remarkably different phenomenon. (0) Ecuador (1) Egypt (7) Indonesia (17) Iran (14) Nigeria (0) Russia (14) Sudan ( Similar to findings by Myers (2005) on human development, our results suggest that abundance in oil and gas is not conducive to instability and violence -quite the contrary: There is strong empirical support for the hypothesis that higher per capita incomes prevent a country from violent conflict and instability (Pearson's r for 'political stability and absence of violence' .623, significant at the .01 level). An alternative measure for the independent variable does not produce such high correlations, but only five countries deviate when we set a threshold of US$ 1,000 p.c. p.a. (2002) and contrasted against above/below average 'political stability' (see Table 1 ). It is particularly remarkable that none of the countries over the US$ 1,000 cut-off point has experienced serious civil conflict between 1990-2002. As expected, higher incomes per capita are closely related to population size, especially when using a threshold of three million inhabitants (-.76, significant at the .01 level). 3 This finding has important theoretical and methodological implications. First, dependence on natural resources is not a good 'proxy variable' for abundance, as already suggested by 2 Of course, the actual amount of revenues for both the government and the private sector differ from these figures. However, they clearly reflect the potential wealth for a country more adequately than dependence. 10 our comparison of Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. This is not to say that dependence has no impact on political instability. There is a strong relationship/correlation between dependence and abundance (.54% of GDP, significant at the 0.01 level), and the independent link between dependence and political stability is significant at the 0.05 level, albeit less strong (.337). In fact, dependence seems to play a major role when income p.c. from exports is relatively low. Most conflict-prone countries below the US$ 1,000 cut-off point are highly dependent on oil and gas exports. On the other hand, rather stable countries with low oil revenue, such as Mexico and Vietnam, are dependent on oil only to a limited extent: In 2002, oil accounted for 11.3% and 20.8% of total exports and 2.9% and 9.2% of GDP respectively.
There are also trouble-ridden countries with low dependence on oil such as Indonesia and Côte d'Ivoire. However, one can easily think of other reasons for violence than oil in these countries.
Related to that but more importantly, our findings imply an significant modification of the resource curse theory. Oil producing countries might be more likely to lapse into conflict than non oil states but in our period of investigation and for our sample of oil and gasproducing countries, there is little evidence that points to a 'paradox of plenty' as regards the likelihood of political instability or violence. The resource curse is confined, if anything, to countries that depend on oil and gas but are not really wealthy in terms of potential income per capita.
Revenue Allocation and Political Stability: Testing Transmission Channels
We are not suggesting that political stability is a simple function of relative abundance in oil.
Income of oil exports per capita might not reflect what countries or governments really earn, and how revenues are actually spent is a completely different story. But how can high oil revenue translate into political stability? Respective transmission channels can be drawn from the theory of the rentier state. According to Ross (2001) , who studies possible reasons why oil hinders democracy, two transmission channels or government strategies can be adapted to our research problem.
The repression effect has two possibly interrelated dimensions. Firstly, governments might spend resource revenue on a huge state security apparatus, thus providing security as a public good. Secondly, they may use that very same security apparatus to suppress any possible opposition (that might take up arms). If the latter feature applies to our sample we should expect that the more stable countries share both high levels of expenditure on the security apparatus and a lack of political freedoms and civil liberties. Elites may not only use sticks to impede armed opposition, but carrots as well. The rentier effect cuts into a number of aspects, some of which are of lesser importance for our research problem at this stage. Although the 'taxation effect' suggests that income from natural resources reduces the accountability of the state elite (Yates 1996: 35) , revenues can be used in a pro-active manner to buy off demands and opposition. This cooptation-effect has hitherto been largely observed by scholars studying the Middle East oil monarchies, and consequently been adapted rather uncritically by resource curse literature (see Ross 2001) . However, it can come in two shapes: First, governments may engage in large-scale distributive policies and generous expenditure on public goods such as health and education. Thus, large-scale distribution, in many cases, permits access to oil wealth on the mere grounds of citizenship. Alternatively, elites may distribute selectively and create clientelist networks from which only leaders of politically important groups benefit. Through this distribution mechanism, oil revenues are distributed among a comparatively small part of the population, and access is granted through personal ties. In what follows, this latter mechanism will be referred to as patronage.
If distributive cooptation is an effective transmission channel to stability, it can be expected that government expenditure on health and other services as well as actual outcomes in human development will be higher in stable countries. 4 The operationalization of selective cooptation or patronage proves to be more difficult. There is certainly no readily available indicator for patronage or clientelism. However, clientelism and patronage tends to be associated with both low government effectiveness and high levels of corruption (Reno 2000 , Chabal & Deloz 1999 and we can use the World Bank Governance Indicators 'control of corruption' and 'government effectiveness' as tentative proxy variables. Thus, when a country scores low in terms of distributive policies and human development but ranks high in corruption and ineffective institutions, we can assume that we are dealing with the 'patronage type'. Whereas large-scale distribution is positively related to the organization of stability, our tentative measures for selective distribution, i.e. patronage and clientelism, are not: Higher government effectiveness and control of corruption tend to be strongly associated with stability. These indicators produce the most significant and robust results thus far (.72 and .75 respectively, both being highly significant).
The findings imply that it is rather governance quality than revenue quantity that makes the difference (Boschini et al. 2004 ). However, oil income p.c. and governance effectiveness and control of corruption are closely related (see Table 4 ), and it is not very plausible that governance quality has a greater effect on income per capita than the other way around: We have operationalized oil income p.c. by the population size and the actual output in oilproduction, and both indicators depend largely on structural and natural conditions rather Basedau/Lacher: A Paradox of Plenty 13 than governance 5 . Nevertheless, governance quality may be partly independent from income levels given that the link with political stability is higher than for income levels.
More importantly, most of the independent variables are not only good predictors for low or higher political stability but are closely interrelated as well. All correlations are at least significant at the 0.01 level.
Two Ideal Types of Oil-Producing Countries
The multicollinearity of the variables precludes a linear regression. Thus, we opted for a qualitative methodology which also keeps individual cases identifiable. We can measure our cases against two ideal types of oil-producing countries:
5 It is conceded that more effective and transparent institutions might increase production. However, the overall absolute potential of production clearly depends on natural conditions.
-Oil-producing countries with an income from oil exports over US$ 1,000 per capita per annum enjoy peace and political stability. Typically, these polities have rather small populations, but more importantly, they spend their oil revenues on a large security apparatus as well as on large-scale distributive policies, with the latter strategy being mirrored in a higher level of human development. Higher oil incomes do not fuel corruption and poor institutional quality but affect government effectiveness and transparency positively.
-Oil-producing countries that earn less than US$ 1,000 per head a year from oil wealth are highly prone to instability and differ substantially in all other respects: They are commonly more populous, and lower revenues result in low military expenditures and non-distributive policies as well as lower levels of human development. Typically, these countries are characterized by high levels of corruption and poor institutional quality, suggesting that oil revenues are distributed through patronage networks. While the degree of dependence does not make a difference as regards the wealthier oil-producing countries, in low oil income countries high degrees of dependence seem to be a risk factor.
These Idealtypen come very close to Realtypen (Max Weber): If we set pertinent thresholds for all characteristics and indicators, and control for high levels of dependence -which reduces the sample to 23 cases (see Table 5 , Appendix) -almost two thirds of all highly dependent oil-producers display the two ideal types. Ten countries show a perfect match and five countries deviate in one out of seven features only. 6 Five countries show two to three deviant characteristics but roughly remain within the range of expectation. It is particularly remarkable that it is only Libya, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia that deviate in terms of the crucial income level from our typology.
Thus, while the evidence provided in this study thus far suggests a virtually deterministic relationship between the per capita amount of oil revenue in a given society on the one hand and the occurrence or absence of violent conflict on the other -mainly via the channeling of oil revenue into the security apparatus and large-scale distribution systems -these few ex- One answer is that these countries represent 'in-between' cases , i.e. they frequently feature indicators which are close to cut-off points in the independent as well as the dependent All this points to the pertinence of additional context variables, especially non-or pre-oil conditions. Therefore, some countries deserve a more in-depth study at this point. We selected Equatorial Guinea and Gabon for a number of reasons. They are small countries that earn considerable amounts of revenues from oil -well above the US$ 1,000 p.c. threshold.
Although relatively stable, they are both characterized by a high level of patronage and clientelism (see Table 5 ), which we have identified as being an obstacle to stability in general.
Contrary to the classification undertaken in this study on the grounds of statistical data, Gabon exhibits pronounced mechanisms of both patronage as well as features of large-scale distribution, and thus defies a clear distinction of both types. Equatorial Guinea, whose per capita oil revenues are among the highest in the sample, shows no convincing evidence for large-scale distribution, but on the contrary is an extreme case of a patronage-based power structure engaging in predation of the country's oil wealth (see Table 5 ). However, despite the centrality of patronage networks and high inequality in the distribution of oil rents in both Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, statistical data accords considerable political stability and virtual absence of violent conflict to both polities. The question remains: How do these countries succeed in organizing stability? 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon: Contradictions of Rentierism
Both Gabon and Equatorial Guinea are heavily dependent on oil -since the early 1970s in the former case, fairly recently in the latter. Unquestionably, oil revenues play a crucial role in both polities. Yet, as we will seek to show in the following brief analysis of rentierism in both states, the effects oil revenues have had on rent distribution as a means of governance and control cannot be reduced to resource-specific properties, and have depended to a considerable degree on factors such as pre-oil power relations and political practices, as well as the integration of the polity into the international system -factors that have thus far largely been neglected in quantitative research on the 'resource curse'. Furthermore, the apparent paradox these two states represent with regard to a relatively 'durable inequality' (Cramer 2003) , in which patronage and governmental predation are accompanied by political stability, permit more general conclusions about the consequences of patronage and large-scale distribution for social change, and their implications for the conflict-proneness of rentier societies. In both cases, it becomes evident that the distribution of oil revenues through patronage networks does indeed foster political instability, as such a distribution will inevitably lead to a struggle over access to rents. However, as rents -which represent the only significant income in these countries -are monopolized by the ruling class, and access to rents is severely restricted, no contesting force outside the ruling class can emerge. The cases of Gabon and Equatorial Guinea show that, while the classical rentier effect of large-scale distribution is certainly only made possible by enormous amounts of oil revenue, rentier mechanisms do not simply depend on the level of rents. Finally, they highlight some of the important methodological problems involved in research on resource politics.
Equatorial Guinea: Persisting Inequality
The case of Equatorial Guinea, which since the mid-1990s has risen to a major African oilproducer with per capita oil revenues similar to those of the Gulf monarchies, poses a problem to the evidence gathered in this article. Contrary to all other countries that wield comparable levels of oil revenue, the Equatoguinean government does not engage in large-scale distribution of its oil wealth, but has been pursuing the privatization and predation of state assets, with significant parts of oil revenue being channeled past the government budget and distributed through patronage networks among a tiny ruling elite, principally consisting of President Obiang Nguema's clan (Wood 2004 , Roitman & Roso 2001 , Global Witness 2004 ). Contrary to most other countries in which oil revenue is distributed on such unequal basis and through personified ties -such as Angola, Congo or Nigeria -Equatorial Guinea has enjoyed considerable political stability, with large-scale violent conflict being virtually absent.
The case of Equatorial Guinea indeed shows that the otherwise widespread tendency towards large-scale distribution of oil revenue is not the natural consequence of high export earnings, as rentier state theory seems to suggest. 7 A decade after oil-production has risen to significant levels and has subsequently endowed Equatorial Guinea with the highest per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa, there are no signs of significant change in governmental policies and expenditures on health or education. Instead, oil revenue continues to be a 'state secret' -in the words of President Obiang -a considerable part of which is kept in In short, the rapid influx of oil wealth to Equatorial Guinea has not led to any tendencies to enlarge the government's power base by distributing oil revenues more widely. Consequently, the living conditions of most Equatoguineans have failed to improve with increasing oil exports, and even deteriorated as a result of 'dutch disease', exacerbating the inequality of the country's distribution of wealth (Frynas 2004) .
One reason for the absence, in Equatorial Guinea, of the rentier mechanisms so typical for the Gulf monarchies might be that oil-production is estimated to last another 10-15 years (EIU 2005) . Thus, the prospects of a rapidly approaching post-oil era might encourage predatory policies aiming to secure as big a share of the cake as possible, instead of building more wider political support that would be as short-lived as oil reserves anyhow.
Yet, maximizing oil-production at the cost of shortening its life was by no means an inevitable answer to the newly found oil wealth. More importantly, the reasons for the predatory policies of the Equatoguinean ruling class have to be sought in practices deeply entrenched in the political pre-oil structures. Long before the advent of oil wealth, Equatorial Guinea had been run like a private estate by President Obiang and his clan. By the time oilproduction started, rent-seeking activities by the ruling class included the granting of concessions for unsustainable logging, the sale of state territory for large-scale dumping of toxic waste, the transformation of the country into a center for arms and drugs trafficking, and the collection of protection money from entrepreneurs operating in the country (Wood 2004 , Roitman & Roso 2001 . Revenues gathered from such illicit practices has enabled the President to strengthen his grip on power by distributing them through patronage networks, See the classic theorisation of rentier politics by Beblawi & Luciani (1987) , based on the Middle Eastern oil states, as well as its adaptation by Ross (2001) .
has therefore played a central role in regime stability; but this role has been constant since independence (Wood 2004 ).
Thus, oil wealth has not significantly changed the power structures in Equatorial Guinea.
The ruling clan has so far successfully managed to restrict access to economic opportunities made possible by the thriving oil business, monopolizing the construction and hotel businesses, controlling access to employment in the oil sector by setting up obligatory 'job agencies', thereby removing political dissidents as well as seizing a large part of workers' salaries (United States Senate 2004 : 99, Africa Confidential 2003 . Far from demonstrating the 'headspinning changes that accompany new oil wealth' and thereby confirming the resourcecurse thesis, as Karl and Gary (2003) hold, Equatorial Guinean rentier politics have been marked by continuity since the pre-oil era. However, the function of the security apparatus has acquired a new quality under the impact of oil wealth as the expansion of security expenditure through oil money -both private and public -has not led to stronger recruitment among the President's clan, but has been used by the regime to buy the services of foreign security firms (EIU 2005 , Frynas 2004 ). This important development has several implications: First, it illustrates the methodological problems associated with quantitative research on opaque polities such as Equatorial Guinea; payments to private security firms do not figure on the -hardly trustworthy -government budget. Second, and more importantly, it demonstrates the further privatization of the Equatoguinean state, with the extension of the security apparatus obviously not intended to strengthen the state's monopoly on the use of force, but exclusively reserved for the protection of the ruling clique and the rentier sector.
Third, it points to the intensifying competition for access to rents among the ruling elite, as the loyalty of the President's kin is no longer taken for granted.
This latter point is linked to the second part of the puzzle which we are confronted with in the case of Equatorial Guinea; namely, the intriguing absence of violent conflict despite the increasing economic inequality produced by the management of oil wealth. Indeed, whereas social unrest has been practically absent in Equatorial Guinea, several failed coups d 'etat 8 linked to members of the President's family indicate that tensions over oil rents are rising amongst the ruling elite (Wood 2004 , Africa Confidential 2004 . Oil wealth, in this context, has both strengthened the regime by permitting the expansion of the security apparatus, as well as increased the probability of political instability in the form of a takeover by a member of the ruling class. The latter scenario, however, is unlikely to lead to changes in the Equatoguinean power structure, or cause violent conflict on a larger scale. Ironically, wider distribution of oil wealth could have intensified and widened rent-seeking competition,
8
The most recent coup attempt in March 2004 also involved British businessmen -including Sir Mark Thatcher -and South African mercenaries who were subsequently arrested in Zimbabwe.
thereby empowering opponents of the regime and heightening the probability of armed conflict. Hence, the case of Equatorial Guinea highlights both the significance of the pre-oil political structure for resource politics, as well as the durability of inequality in rentier states which -rather than containing political dissent through large-scale distribution of oil revenue -restrict access to rents in order to prevent the empowerment of potential rivals, thereby suppressing violent conflict.
Gabon: Rentierism and its External Allies
Contrary to Equatorial Guinea, oil rentierism has dominated the Gabonese political economy for the most part of its sovereign existence -representing the main share of export earnings and government revenue since the early 1970s -and oil-production is projected to decline during the next decade (EIU 2004). As would be expected for a country displaying, over a period of over thirty years, exceptionally high levels of oil revenue per capita, Gabon shows some features of large-scale distribution, reflected in its considerable public expenditure, an extensive public sector, as well as education and health expenditures which are substantially above the sub-Saharan African average (World Bank 1997). However, a closer look raises questions about the nature of Gabonese rentierism in terms of the categories this article proposes. Thus, the unequal distribution of wealth is comparable to that of neighboring Equatorial Guinea, and poverty remains widespread despite long-lasting oil wealth. High expenditures on education and wealth have not yielded significant results, and Gabon's health record is still comparable to that of poor sub-Saharan countries (World Bank 1997).
Moreover -and contrary to what corruption indicators seem to suggest -predation of oil revenue persists at the highest state level. Investigations have estimated that, over the last decades, a fourth of state oil revenue has never reached the government budget (Gardinier 2003) . Oil money fuels networks of patronage, providing political support for President Omar Bongo, who has ruled the country since 1967 (EIU 2004). We are thus confronted with an apparent co-existence of relatively large-scale distributive policies with patronage through personal networks, which raises the question as to which of both mechanisms played the major role in providing the basis for the Bongo regime's longevity. Furthermore, the combination of large-scale distributive policies with patronage networks does not explain the political stability Gabon has witnessed, but on the contrary can be understood to increase the probability of violent conflict, as both competition over oil revenues and social unrest caused by oil price volatility and diminishing production are likely to destabilize the power basis of President Bongo. How, then, can the virtual absence of violent conflict in Gabon be explained?
Government policies -particularly during the oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s -clearly opted for large-scale distribution through the expansion of the public sector. While Gabon's population doubled in the first three decades of independence, "public employment multiplied nearly twelve times" (Gardinier 2003: 252) . However, low oil prices since the mid1980s led to long-term recession and increasing unemployment, and growing indebtedness due to mismanagement and inefficient infrastructure investment projects forced the regime to freeze wages and reduce employment in the public sector (Yates 1996: 123-136) . The supposed power basis of the regime, the public employees, turned out to be a source of political instability, as pressures towards political reform -resulting in a superficial reinstallation of multi-party politics -as well as civil unrest and rioting originated from these groups (Yates 1996 , Gardinier 2003 . class. Social change generated by such distribution, in particular through economic empowerment and higher education, contributes to the processes of political reform currently underway -to a varying degree -in the Gulf monarchies, which can be the source of political stability as well as conflict (Ehteshami 2003) . However, as witnessed in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, patronage networks, privatized security and foreign intervention can inhibit the formation or the force of societal pressures, while providing a relatively stable power base for the ruling class.
Conclusion
Resource curse theory claims that natural resource wealth is conducive to instability and violent conflict. In contrast, the evidence presented in this article suggests that, in fact, there is no 'paradox of plenty' with regard to the likelihood of instability and violence in oilproducing countries. High-income oil states are largely spared by violence, while countries with lower revenues per capita are more likely to suffer from considerable political instabil-9
The claim that oil wealth is significantly associated with authoritarianism has also been challenged in quantitative research by Herb (2003 * Significant at the 0.1 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level; rounded.
